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The Dilemma of
Criminal Responsibility*
By DAVID L. BAZELON**
INTRODUCTION
Today the insanity defense is under more sustained attack than
at any time since I wrote the opinion for our court in Durham v
United States' nearly thirty years ago. Congress is considering a
number of proposals to eliminate the insanity defense or to curtail
it dramatically. Just last week the American Medical Association
Board of Trustees jumped on the bandwagon, calling for complete
abolition of the defense.
We are told, to put it mildly, that the insanity defense is not
working very well. Juries are confused, it is claimed, by the spec-
tacle of competing psychiatric experts. More importantly, it is said
that our society, plagued as it is by the mghtmare of street crime,
can no longer afford the luxury of a test of crimnal responsibility
When we are fighting for our very survival, we cannot be too
humane to the enemy within our gates. It seems as though the in-
sanity defense has become a scapegoat for the failure of the entire
criminal justice system. Although the defense is raised m only about
two percent of the criminal cases that go to trial-and succeeds in
only one of four cases in which it is raised-many of the most sen-
sational cases involve well-publicized insanity pleas. As a result, each
new insanity acquittal brings renewed cries of outrage that criminals
are, literally, "getting away with murder." The law itself is seen
as an enemy of social order rather than a safeguard.
This, I believe, is what Senator Mattingly was driving at when
he said on the floor of the Senate: "[s]ociety has a right to be pro-
.Copyright 1983 by David L. Bazelon. This Article was presented at the University
of Kentucky College of Law on November 17, 1983, as the Roy and Virginia Ray Lecture.
The footnotes have been added.
.. Semor Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.
1214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), overruled, Brawner v. United States, 471 F.2d 969
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc).
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tected from the likes of John Hinckley, [whether] sane or
insane." 2 Or Presidential Counselor Edwin Meese, when he sug-
gested that with the abolition of the insanity defense, "[w]e would
do a lot better as far as ridding the streets of some of the most
dangerous people that are out there, that are committing a
disproportionate number of cnmes."
I agree with these critics that the insanity defense has not worked
very well. I agree too that there is a connection between the terri-
ble problem of street crime and our tests of crinunal responsibili-
ty But here we must part company I believe that the failure of
the insanity defense and the problems of street crime have been
caused not by too much compassion, but by too little-by a failure
of our moral imagination, not an excess. Curtailing or even
abolishing tests of criminal responsibility will not stem the persis-
tent flow of street criminals into our courts. These "get tough"
measures betray a complete misunderstanding of the problem. It
is only through an expansion of our tests of criminal responsibility
that we can hope to alert the community to the root causes of crime,
and, in turn, to move toward solutions.
I would like to share with you the lessons of over thirty years'
experience with the insanity defense. Some might view our grappl-
ing with these questions of criminal responsibility as a failed
experiment-full of sound and fury, but signifying nothing. But
I have always viewed law not as a static order built on certitude,
but as a dynamic order built on process. Courts work through cases,
actual conflicts which must be resolved whether or not all the in-
formation we might wish to have is available. Facts and values in
the world are ever changing; every decision is made in that terrible
period known as meanwhile. What is more, the world changes as
a result of our decisions. How the world will be reshaped through
law is never predictable with certainty beforehand. So in later cases
we must peer out and see the consequences-or the wreckage-of
our handiwork. In our thirty-year experiment with the insanity
defense in the District of Columbia, we have seen a lot of wreckage.
But the process has been as illuminating as it has been frustrating.
Our story begins on the eve of the decision in Durham v United
States. At that time, we were optimistic that the young and pro-
2 128 CONG. Rac. S7243 (daily ed. June 22, 1983) (statement of Sen. Mattingly).
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mising discipline of psychiatry would open up new vistas in our in-
quiry into the causes of human behavior. That hope, expressed in
Durham, was not realized. Over the years I have grown disillusioned
in many ways with the application of psychiatry to the criminal law
At first, I was troubled that psychiatrists were not candidly shar-
ing their knowledge with us. In time, I came to realize that the dif-
ficulty was more profound. The problem was not that psychiatric
medicine wouldn't give us all the answers. The problem was that
it didn't have all the answers. What have we learned from
M'Naghten to Durham to Brawner to the present? That the bedrock
issue n the law of crmunal responsibility is not medical but societal;
and the scale of the solution must match the scale of the problem.
I. PARADIGMS LOST: FROM M'NAGHTENTO DURHAMTO BRA WNER
At the time of my appointment to the bench in 1949, defen-
dants who raised the insanity defense in the District of Columbia
were subject to a slightly modified M'Naghten test.' The
M'Naghten test was the revolutionary piece of judicial lawmaking
of another era. In 1843, Daniel M'Naghten, convinced that British
Prime Minister Peel, the Pope and the Jesuits were all conspiring
to kill him, decided to launch a preemptive strike of his own and
kill Peel. Upon his arrival at 10 Downing Street, M'Naghten killed
Peel's secretary, Drummond, under the mistaken belief that the poor
fellow was Peel. M'Naghten was acquitted by a jury, but his case
created a furor in Parliament. The issue was referred to the com-
mon law judges, who set out the famous formulation that an ac-
cused could not be found crimnally responsible if it was shown that
he was suffering from such "a defect of reason, from disease of
the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know what he was do-
ing was wrong." 4 The new rule expressed the simple principle that
it is both wrong and useless for society to impose punishment where
it cannot attribute blame. The rule was, of course, met with cries
of outrage. A popular poem of the time foreshadowed the public's
response over a century later in the Hinckley case:
3 For a bnef general discussion of the M'Naghten Test see W LAFAVE & A. Scorr,
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 37 (1972).
4 M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
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"Ye people of England: exult and be glad
For you're now at the will of the merciless mad."
Well, the heresy of one age often becomes the orthodoxy of
another. In the early 1950's M'Naghten was the prevailing rule in
almost every American jurisdiction. The more cases I reviewed,
however, the more strongly I felt that M'Naghten had become an
anachronism. M'Naghten required that behavioral scientists con-
fine their testimony to a single narrow issue: whether the defen-
dant knew what he was doing and knew whether it was right or
wrong. It seemed to ignore the modem dynamic theories of the
human personality as an integrated whole. It concentrated on a single
aspect of that personality-cognitive reason-as the sole deternmi-
nant of human behavior. Psychiatrists who testified under
M'Naghten were engaging in a charade. They were supplying
answers under the guise of expert medical opinion to questions that
were essentially metaphysical.
Psychiatrists implored us to free them from the straitjacket of
M'Naghten and to permit them to give a more adequate account
of psychic realities. If psychiatrists were to testify meaningfully as
experts on the issue of criminal responsibility, they had to be allowed
to address that issue m terms appropriate to their medical discipline.
I felt strongly at that time, as I do now, that the question of
guilt or innocence was not a medical question, but a moral one.
Valid moral judgments, however, required the best information
available about every aspect of the defendant's functioning, and
psychiatrists promised a wealth of facts about human behavior. To
obtain these facts for the jury, I wrote the opinion in the Durham
case. Durham held that an accused is not crimnally responsible if
it is shown that "is unlawful act was the product of mental disease
or defect." 5
Durham was a challenge both to behavioral scientists and to
juries. It challenged the behavioral scientists because it subjected
their discipline to full and searching inquiry Now that we had
removed the millstone of M'Naghten, they had to make full
disclosure: to let us know everything that their discipline could tell
us about the accused, and perhaps more important, everything their
5 214 F.2d at 875. See W LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 3, § 38, at 286-92 for a
discussion of the Durham test.
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discipline could not tell us. We needed to know both the known
and the unknown about human behavior. Durham was also intended
to challenge juries to come to informed moral decisions without
the benefit of conclusory testimony from the experts.
Some have said Durham was intended to give over the ques-
tion of moral responsibility to the doctors. Nothing could be more
wrong. Our goal in broademng the scope of their testimony was
to give the jury a more complete picture of why the accused acted
the way he did. It was up to the jury to decide for legal, not medical,
purposes whether a mental disease or defect was present and, if so,
whether the act was the product of that disease or defect. These
questions were intelligible only in the moral sphere, not in medical
science.
Well, it didn't work out that way Law in action is very dif-
ferent from law in theory For while better decisions required can-
dor from psychiatrists and initiative from jurors, easier decisions
did not. And easy decisions were what we got. Psychiatrists con-
tinued to use conclusory labels without explaimng the origin, de-
velopment, or manifestations of a disease in terms meaningful to
the jury Instead of testifying as to the defendant's capacity to
discern right from wrong, they testified as to new ultimate conclu-
sions: the existence of mental disease and the question of whether
the act was its product.
I don't mean to suggest that psychiatrists are evil people, or
even that the failure of Durham was entirely their fault. Partisan
lawyers wanted certain, not equivocal answers; the legal process has
trouble with ambiguity Indeed, the psychiatrists were only respond-
ing to the conclusory questions put to them. Psychiatrists also were
unaccustomed to having their diagnoses, and even the integrity of
their discipline itself, subjected to the often hostile scrutiny of the
adversary process. Finally, judges and juries preferred to have their
weighty responsibilities delegated to experts.
But the psychiatrists had promised candor and had a special
obligation to make good their promise. Psychiatrists had an obliga-
tion to reveal that a proper examination required time and resources
that they did not have. The late Dr. Winfred Overholser, superinten-
dent of St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, was one of the early
champions of the Durham decision. Yet, even after Durham, St.
Elizabeth's psychiatrists continued to come into court and give the
1983-84]
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same conclusory testimony as before. After a few years I asked Dr.
Overholser why his staff still clung to their boilerplate testimony
He told me not to blame the psychiatrists. He informed me that
a sanity examnation that would fulfill the Durham requirements
would take up to 100 hours of interviews and investigation and that
such examinations were impossible given the hospital's meager
resources. State hospitals like St. Elizabeth's could only manage
a few hours at most with each defendant. I told him that if this
were true, I did not blame the staff psychiatrists. Instead, I blam-
ed him for his failure to fight with Congress for the resources
necessary to do proper examinations, and for his failure to instruct
his staff to point out in their testimony the patent inadequacy of
their data.
State psychiatrists had an obligation as well to acknowledge that
their appraisals were often influenced by the bedspace they had
available, by their willingness to have certain defendants as patients
after acquittals, by political pressure, and by their own ideas about
criminal responsibility They also had a duty to reveal the uncer-
tainties in their diagnoses and the disagreements among the staff
in official hospital reports. Often the final report that appeared m
court reflected only the majority view at the staff conference. As
a result, attorneys and their clients, as well as judges and juries,
were left unaware of minority viewpoints that might have shed a
very different light on their inquiries. For years I tried unsuccessfully
to obtain records or tapes of St. Elizabeth's staff conferences where
official diagnoses were made. I believed that juries had a right to
see the practice of psychiatry as it was: not as a science dealing with
absolute physical laws, but as a diagnostic art based on educated,
but nonverifiable, hypotheses.
Durham was a simple contract between law and medicine. Doc-
tors offered candor and insight if the law would free them from
M'Naghten. We accepted. For eighteen years we tried to avoid the
conclusion that the contract had been breached.
We tried in a long series of cases to work with the Durham for-
mulation to evolve a way of gaining the benefit of all relevant in-
formation, while avoiding the kind of conclusory expert testimony
I have described. Nothing worked. Finally, in 1972, we admitted
that our best laid plans had gone awry; in Brawner v United
[Vol. 72
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States,6 our court unammously decided to abandon the Durham
rule.
The court substituted a new test proposed by the American Law
Institute.7 The rule provides: "[a] person is not responsible for
criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of men-
tal disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate
the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law." 8 Mental disease or defect was limited to
medically-recognized conditions characterized by broad consensus
that free will was absent.
II. UNITED STATES V BRA WNER:
LOOKING FOR LAW IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES
While I agreed that Durham had failed in operation and had
to be abandoned, I believed then, and continue to believe that, at
best, Brawner did nothing to address the problems of Durham, and
at worse, aggravated them. I concurred in overruling Durham, but
not in the new test adopted. 9 As I said in my opinion, "while the
generals are designing an inspiring new insignia for the standard,
the battle is being lost in the trenches." 10 Brawner seemed to
believe that the infirmities of Durham could be cured by mampula-
tion of the language of the test. But the problem of conclusory
testimony on the issue of "productivity" could not be altered by
magically changing the word "product" to the word "result." Both
embody the ultimate question of causality. Neither is suitable for
resolution by experts. One term is as liable as the other to be abus-
ed. If we had learned anything at all from Durham, it was that the
problem of administering the defense could not be solved by a ver-
bal trick.
Nor did Brawner solve the problem of domination by medical
experts. In effect, it limited the range of testimony to medically
recognized conditions. The battle over the validity of diagnoses was
6 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc).
7 This test is discussed m W LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 3, at 292-95.
8 471 F.2d at 973 (citing Model Penal Code § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962)).
9 See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc)
(Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
10 Id. at 1012.
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merely diverted to a battle over medical recognition. This greater
reliance on acceptance in the medical community flew in the face
of the critical lesson of nearly two decades with Durham: that
psychiatrists did not have a monopoly on knowledge about human
behavior. All around us were signs that we knew very little about
the causes of human behavior, and that much of what we were begin-
ning to know was coming from sources other than psychiatrists.
Neuroscientists, for example, are making gigantic stndes in solv-
ing the mysteries of the human brain, and in turn, of human
behavior. They are beginning to discover that deficiencies in
neurotransmitters, complicated protein molecules in the brain, may
play a role in abnormal behavior I have been engaged for some
time in a dialogue on the potential contributions that neuroscience
can make to law with some of the world's leading neuroscientists,
including Dr. Joel Elkes of the University of Louisville and, more
recently, with Dr. Floyd Bloom of the Salk Institute. Dr. Bloom
informs me that scientists are learmng how specific circuits in the
brain, operating through known chemical substances, perform func-
tions which outline how behavioral events may be regulated. Anx-
iety, depression, and aggression can all be enhanced or diminished
by the action of certain chemicals in the brain. Behavior is, of course,
a highly complex phenomenon and is invariably socially determin-
ed, at least in part. Science may never provide complete answers.
Moreover, the possibilities of biochemical alteration of behavior
will present new challenges for law But my discussions with Dr.
Bloom and others have convinced me that there is more to know
about human behavior than is dreamt of in DSM Ill. " They have
convinced me too that there is more that remains hidden about the
wellsprings of human behavior than we ever thought. Our moral
judgments of other human beings must reflect the humility borne
of self-doubt.
Of even greater importance was evidence about human behavior
that no judge could fail to see. Day after day I found myself review-
ing the convictions of persons who had committed horrible acts of
violence. I needed no experts to tell me who these people were. The
overwhelming majority of defendants who came through our court
1 DSM III is the common abbreviation for the standard manual of psychiatric
diagnoses.
[Vol. 72
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
came from the very bottom of our society They have been called
by different names-the underclass, the culture of poverty, the other
America. But the reality remained the same. Our courts were and
are being filled by this wreckage of our affluent society
As an appellate judge, I could have chosen to ignore this harsh
reality; I could have concerned myself solely with the abstract legal
principles involved m each case without inquirng into the identities
of the human beings whose lives were to be affected by our deter-
minations. Indeed, Justice Felix Frankfurter, a good friend despite
some differences, often implored me to maintain precisely this sort
of "disinterestedness in the judicial process." Yet, I have always
felt it was part of my function to infuse my consideration of legal
principles with the passion and pain of life in our society, for law
is a social product. Legal principles have meaning only as they af-
fect human beings. Obviously, this does not mean that personal
feelings can determine the outcome of cases, or that criminal con-
victions may be overturned merely because a judge feels sympathy
for the defendant. But I have always felt compelled to learn as much
as possible about the impact of law on individuals. Consequently,
I made it my practice in every criminal case to request the pre-
sentence investigations made by the trial court. These reports,
although frequently conclusory and umnformative, did provide
enough evidence to reinforce my impression that the defendants
whose cases fill our criminal dockets have never really had a chance
in life. I did not need doctors and exotic diagnostic categories to
inform me of the terrible burdens of poverty, racism and despair
under which these people struggled. I did not need Rorschach tests
and EEG's to explain to me the causes of crime.
My experience with Durham taught me that valid moral
judgments of these offenders required information from any and
all sources about their lives. The tragedy of Brawner was that it
re-medicalized the problem. It permitted juries to focus on medical
jargon but deprived them of insight into the social pressures that
produced the tragedies in front of them. In my separate opimon
in Brawner, I suggested a new approach. I proposed that the jury
be instructed that a defendant is not responsible "if at the time of
his unlawful conduct his mental or emotional processes or behavior
controls were impaired to such an extent that he cannot justly be
1983-841
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held responsible.'' 2 This test, if properly administered, frees the
law of criminal responsibility from a medical model. It allows anyone
with knowledge of the offender's life-psychologists, sociologists,
teachers, ministers, neighbors-to tell the jury about the defendant
and his environment. The test, moreover, candidly informs the jury
that it is their function to apply the moral standards of the com-
munity to what they have learned about the offender.
III. JURIES AND JUSTICE
Only if the jury can hear the broadest possible array of evidence
and then invoke its collective moral sense can a criminal trial realize
the potential that I envision for it. Every criminal trial should be
an audit of an event and an offender. The crimnal trial is a wm-
dow into a world that the community rarely sees. The jury's con-
sideration of the issue of criminal responsibility is an opportunity
for a cross section of the community to confront the culture of
poverty, to see its pernicious effects, to understand the crushing
reality of deprivation, ignorance and despair. It is my hope that
this forced association of community and criminal will lead to in-
sight. And that insight will lead to empathy And that empathy will
lead to action. It is my belief that one of our few hopes for ad-
dressing the crime problem lies in this stark confrontation between
juries and defendant. The courtroom is perhaps the only place that
we can compel society's attention to the root causes of crime.
The test proposed in my opinion in Brawner will not in itself
effect any magical transformation. Indeed, it may introduce new
problems. We will have to decide, for example, what to do with
offenders who are found "not justly responsible," but who are,
nevertheless, not mentally ill in any medically recognized sense. But
I am firmly convinced of one thing: we will never resolve the pro-
blem of crime without first addressing its roots in poverty and social
injustice. I have suggested one possible method, but precisely how
we focus society's attention on this issue is less important than that
we do, somehow, direct attention to it.
Some may find my call to confront the roots of crime in the
culture of poverty out of place in the more hardheaded world of
12 Id. at 1032 (emphasis added).
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the 1980's. Today we are told that crime can be controlled, but on-
ly if those who violate society's norms, whatever the reason, are
quickly apprehended and subjected to swift, certain, and severe
punishment. As President Reagan phrased it, we should "put on
the back burner the idea of reformng and rehabilitating criminals
and get back on the front burner the idea of prosecuting, punishing,
and putting them away "
I can well understand the attractiveness of this crime control
perspective. The explosion of violent crime in our cities has made
us strangers in our own land. It would be comforting to believe that
there are simple answers to this terrifying problem. Comforting,
but wrong. Changing a word here and a word there in the insanity
test will not effect any great metamorphosis. The much-touted "guil-
ty but insane" verdict will do little but reassign people from gross-
ly underfunded mental hospitals to prisons with their all-but-
nonexistent psychiatric services. Elimnating the defense entirely will
similarly reallocate from hospitals to prisons those least likely to
survive in the savage jungle that is our prison system.
What we must do to reduce crime is attack the conditions that
breed it. It will require money to rebuild our inner cities, to pro-
vide quality education, proper nutrition, health care and social ser-
vices. It won't happen tomorrow, even if we make the commitment.
And in the meantime, our criminal justice system must operate. We
must conduct this searching inquiry into the criminal's life history,
not so much to excuse, but to appreciate the conditions that in-
evitably lead to criminal behavior. For if we fail to wake up to the
realities of crime, we will be doomed to the vicious cycle of crime
and repression and more crime.
IV FIRST STEPS: TOWARD PROCEDURAL JUSTICE FOR THE POOR
While I am convinced that the solution to our crime problem
lies in a long term investment in alleviating the burdens of poverty,
I believe that our commitment to a more just society must begin
by eliminating the continuing injustices confronted by the criminal
defendant-and, in particular, the indigent defendant-in the arms
of the law
The insanity plea, for example, has been criticized as a "rich
man's defense." Sensational cases like those of Patricia Hearst and
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John Hinckley create the impression that a successful insanity
defense requires vast resources. This is largely true. A proper in-
sanity defense costs money It requires a good lawyer, as well as
extended examinations by independent experts. Indigent insanity
defendants usually get neither. Lawyers representing indigents are
often overworked and inexperienced. In addition, a defendant rais-
ing the insanity defense presently has no right to an independent
expert in most jurisdictions. Most often, the accused who gives notice
that he intends to raise an insanity defense is sent to the state hospital
for examination.
As I noted earlier, psychiatry is not a value-free discipline.
Psychiatrists m state hospitals often have a hidden agenda, whether
conscious or not. By hidden agenda I mean the institutional pressure
and personal biases that cause psychiatrists to serve interests other
than the therapeutic needs of their patients. In one case before my
court, United States v Morgan,3 a government psychiatrist, after
being informed by an Assistant United States Attorney that a case
was "one of major significance," actually changed his diagnosis
of the accused from "chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia" to
"without mental disease."1 4 Although cases involving such direct
prostitution of the diagnostic process are probably rare, forensic
psychiatrists are often at least indirectly influenced by external
demands. Years ago the Superintendent of the Napa State Hospital
in California told me with commendable candor that "Sacramen-
to was always looking over [his] shoulder on internal decisions."
While most hospitals are probably not so closely monitored, it is
clear that state hospital psychiatrists have institutional needs and
perspectives which make them less likely to support the defendant's
insanity plea. Since insanity trials fail to elicit the institutional biases
that lead to particular results, the indigent defendant, as a result
of his inability to secure an independent expert, is fundamentally
prejudiced in his attempt to raise this affirmative defense provided
by law
What is more, while at the state facility, the defendant is on
alien ground, without the procedural protections afforded at other
stages of the criminal process. A recent case decided in our circuit,
1 482 F.2d 786 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
14 Id. at 788-89.
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United States v Byers,5 is illustrative. Byers was arrested for
murder and committed to St. Elizabeth's, the government hospital,
for examination. 16 The psychiatrists found that Byers had been af-
flicted with delusions at the time of the killing, believing himself
under a spell that could only be broken by killing the victim. 7 The
government did not accept this diagnosis and so committed Byers,
over defense objections, to a second government hospital, this one
in Springfield, Missouri. 8
Byers spent eight weeks there without a lawyer, without any warn-
ing that the psychiatrists encouraging a free flow of communica-
tion could be adversaries at trial, and without any records kept of
the psychiatric interviews.19 At trial, the psychiatrist dropped a
bombshell. He stated that Byers told him that the story of the spells
had been suggested to him by his wife after his arrest. No record
of this disclosure was in the psychiatrist's notes or any place else. 20
In the words of the trial judge, this testimony was "devastating"
to Byers' defense. 21 The prosecutor agreed it was critical.*2
The Byers case points out fundamental problems with the ad-
mimstration of the insanity defense. It seems to me that the con-
stitutional protections against self-incrimination as well as the fifth
and sixth amendment guarantees of due process and effective
assistance of counsel all require, at a minmum, the presence of
counsel or a taped record of psychiatric interviews. The American
Psychiatric Association has opposed such measures on the ground
that they would undermine the therapeutic relationship between the
psychiatrist and the defendant. But the state hospital is an institu-
tion where a therapeutic facade masks a real adversity of interests
between doctor and patient. Psychiatrists cannot have it both ways.
They cannot invoke the sanctity of the doctor-patient relationship
to justify the unimpeded collection of information that may then
15 No. 78-1451 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 24, 1980) (currently available on LEXIS Genfed library,
Cir. file), aff'd, (D.C. Cir. May 19, 1983) (en bane) (opimons to follow), cert. denied, 52
U.S.L.W 3510 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1984) (No. 83-5282).
16 Id. slip op. at I (Bazelon, C. J. dissenting).
17 See id., slip op. at 13, 14-15 & n. 47.
18 Id., slip op. at 1, 12.
19 Id., op. at 1, 25-2720 Id., slip op at 18 & n. 54, 24-25 & n. 75.
21 Id., slip op. at 19.
2 Id.
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convict that patient at trial. The protections that I suggest assure
that insanity verdicts will not come down to the defendant's word
against the unverifiable word of the expert.
While any criminal defendant raising the defense can be ordered
to the state hospital, it is the indigent defendant who is almost always
forced to rely on state doctors for his own defense. Still greater pro-
cedural protections could be assured if an independent pool of
defense psychiatric experts were attached to each public defender's
office.
We must also assure that the indigent defendant's sanity or in-
sanity does not hinge on a psychiatrist's or factfinder's stereotyped
view of ghetto life. Psychiatric experts have speculated whether the
defendant would have committed the act in question had he not
been mentally ill. Such speculation is rife with potential for the ar-
ticulation of social prejudices in the guise of medical science. I was
once told by some lawyers (the story was later verified to me privately
by the judge in question) of the case of a sixteen-year-old black girl
who had literally sliced her boyfriend to ribbons with a piece of
broken glass. Although the child had a previous history of mental
health problems, the judge, relying on the testimony of a
psychiatrist, found that the girl's behavior was not "sick" because
such conduct was "normal" in her ghetto subculture. Thus, to the
limited degree that this offender's background was taken into ac-
count, it was used to convict an indigent person, for whom violence
was seen to be "normal." Presumably, a wealthier offender might
have been acquitted since her acts would be considered sick because
violence is not part of her environment. Such discriminatory con-
jecture must not be permitted to affect the decisionmaking process.
CONCLUSION
Again, I must emphasize that these procedural protections are
nothing more than tentative first steps. By themselves, they win not
even make a dent in the underlying problem of crime. The problem
presents our society with a stark choice between two largely con-
flicting alternatives, each of which will consume a substantial por-
tion of our financial and spiritual resources. First, we can vent our
frustration and rage, by lasing out after the fact at the criminals
we apprehend. Sentences can be made even longer; procedural pro-
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tections can drop away. I do not embrace this view, but not because
I think it is an overreaction to the problem.
I do not deny that crime in America has reached the point of
crisis. Everyone feels compelled to offer tough talk and suggest tough
measures. The insanity defense has become a convenient symbolic
target in this war of words. But righteous rage even if eloquently
or loudly expressed will not solve the problem. Nor will turning the
screw even more tightly. For as sanctions have become more
stringent, crime rates have soared. The only constant correlation
with crime has been deprivation. Collective anger hasn't worked.
We must take a different path.
Judge Elbert Tuttle, one of the great jurists of our time, has
said: "[t]he only way the law has progressed from the days of the
rack, the screw and the wheel, is the development of moral
concepts." 2 But with our prisons at the bursting point, and the
despair in our inner cities as great as ever, I am skeptical about the
extent of our moral evolution. Today I see an ominous chasm bet-
ween the idea of law and the idea of justice in our society The law
of criminal responsibililty, as I envision it, provides a glimmer of
hope that the chasm can be bridged. The community must realize
that the solution to the problem of crime is not in casting out its
outcasts a second time, but in reaching out and fashioning a com-
munity to which all can belong. Over a century ago, Dostoevsky
put these words in the mouth of a minor character in Crime and
Punishment: "In this age the sentiment of compassion is actually
prohibited by science." Let it not be said today that it is prohibited
by law
Novak v. Betto, 453 F.2d 661, 672 (5th Cir. 1971) (Tuttle, J., concumng in part,
dissenting in part), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 968 (1972).
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